Chinese
Nuclear Proliferation
Including
Canadian Dimensions
Notes for Remarks by
David B. Harris,
President and CEO,
Democracy House
to the
Canadian Coalition
for Democracies’ China
Symposium
10 June 2008, Room 200,
West Block, House of Commons, Ottawa,
Canada
-
DRAFT NOTES ONLY; CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY -
(1) Nuclear weapons, related material, and their
proliferation, constitute a grave and growing danger.
Many consequences of nuclear detonations are well
known: blast effect, searing heat, ionizing radiation. Hiroshima
and Nagasaki’s
suffering continue to this day.
We’re warned of nuclear winter.
(2) ElectroMagnetic Pulse
The implications of electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
effect, an especially devastating consequence of high-altitude nuclear
explosions of over one megaton yield, were largely secret before 1997.
That year, and in some legislative forums, thereafter, increasing heed was paid
to the threat to society and entire nation-states, represented by EMP.
Dr. Lowell Wood of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory was among a number of
experts to warn of this in testimony before US congressional bodies. Expert
predictions indicate that EMP would return the US to a state technologically,
economically and perhaps even socially, reminiscent of very early Twentieth
Century life. One specialist spoke of a return to Jeffersonian
America – the early part of the 1800s. No electricity, cars, modern medicine. Survival of the fittest. Social, political and economic
colonization by those with military and economic might. So, perhaps, China
and Saudi Arabia?
All of this could be achieved by a single high-altitude atomic explosion
that would not necessarily, in and of itself, kill a single individual on the
ground.
Electromagnetic
pulses, EMP, generated by high-altitude nuclear explosions have riveted the
attention of the military nuclear tactical community for three-and-a-half
decades since the first comparatively modest one very unexpectedly turned off
the lights over a few million square miles in the mid-Pacific. This EMP also
shut down radio stations, turned off cars, burned out telephone systems, and
wreaked other mischief throughout the Hawaiian Islands
nearly 1,000 miles distant from ground zero.
The potential for even a single high-altitude explosion
of a more deliberate character to impose continental-scale devastation of much
of the equipment of modern civilization and of modern warfare soon became
clear. EMP became a technological substrate for the black humor:
Suppose they gave a war and nobody came.
It was EMP-imposed wreckage, at least as much as that
due to blast, fire, and fallout, which sobered detail studies of the
post-nuclear-attack recovery process. When essentially nothing electrical or
electronic could be relied upon to work, even in rural areas far from the
blast, it appeared surpassingly difficult to bootstrap American national
recovery, and post-attack America in these studies remained stuck in the very
early 20th century until electrical equipment and electronic components begin
to trickle into a Jeffersonian America from
abroad.{United States House of Representatives, Committee on National Security,
Military Research and Development Subcommittee, “Threat Posed by
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure,”
commdocs.house.gov, 16 July 1997, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has197010.000/has197010_1.HTM
(accessed 17 April 2008). [Remarks by Dr. Lowell Wood of the
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, in which he describes the serious and widespread
consequences of the electromagnetic pulse that might result from a
high-altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon.}
(3) In light of this, civilization
must put an end to nuclear proliferation, before nuclear proliferation puts an
end to civilization.
(4) The People’s Republic of
China (hereinafter “PRC” or
“China”)
has been a serious problem. The country is driven by a
demonstrably-aggressive regime whose history of human-rights’ abuses – from
gulag and slave-labour colonies to organ-harvesting – points to the governing
Communist Party dictatorship’s gross failure to accept norms of civilized
international conduct. The Party is a nuclear military power, and, in the
absence of any noticeable increase in threats faced by the country, has
presided over a monumental 18% per annum growth in its military budget. Menace.
(5) China Proliferates to:
a. General
David
Martin (at ccnr) says that China’s nuclear tests of the 1990s
were in the teeth of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.
Indeed, they were “a significant stumbling block to progress on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” China joined the IAEA in ’84, and NPT in 1992.
George Tenet, “DCI Before the Senate
Select Committee on
Intelligence,” cia.gov, 28 January
1998, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1998/dci_speech_012898.html
(accessed 6 June 2008):
Chinese and
Russian assistance to proliferant countries requires
particular attention, despite signs of progress. My statement for the record provides the details but some key points should be made here.
With regard to China,
its defense industries
are under increasing pressure to become profit making
organizations--an imperative that can
put them at odds with US interests. Conventional
arm sales have lagged in recent years,
encouraging Chinese defense industries to look to WMD technology-
related sales, primarily to Pakistan
and Iran,
in order to recoup. There is no question that China
has contributed to WMD advances in these
countries.
On the positive side, there have recently been some signs of improvement in China's
proliferation posture. China
recently enacted its first comprehensive laws governing nuclear technology exports. It also
appears to have tightened down on its
most worrisome nuclear transfers, and it recently renewed its pledge to halt
sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.
But China's
relations with some proliferant countries are long-standing
and deep, Mr. Chairman. The jury is
still out on whether the
recent changes are broad enough in
scope and whether they will hold over the longer
term. As such, Chinese activities in this area will require continued
close watching.
Apartheid South Africa:
China sent 60 tons of unsafeguarded enriched uranium in 1981 to then-non-NPT
apartheid South Africa,
which may have allowed one S. African facility to triple weapons-grade
production at at least one nuclear facility.
[Footnoted in Nuclear Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation
Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d.
(1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm
(accessed 2 June 2008), to Leonard Spector, Nuclear
Ambitions, 1990, p. 274; Michael Brenner, "People's Republic of
China," in International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation,
Ed. William Potter, 1990, p. 253.] Also in 1981, PRC shipped highly enriched
uranium, uranium hexafluoride and heavy water to non-NPT Argentina, a
country with a nuclear weapons program. [Footnoted in Nuclear Control
Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear
Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm
(accessed 2 June 2008), to Judith Miller, "U.S. is Holding Up Peking Atom
Talks," New York Times, September 19, 1982; Brenner, ibid.;
Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "A New China
Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar," Washington Post, May 12, 1991,
p. C4.]
Algeria: From about
November 1984, China
was building a significant unsafeguarded
plutonium-production reactor, only months after saying all PRC exports would go
through IAEA clearance. [Nuclear Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation
Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d.
(1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm
(accessed 2 June 2008), to Vipin Gupta,
"Algeria's Nuclear Ambitions," International Defense
Review, #4, 1992, pp. 329-330.] Also provided
equipment usable for handling radioactive spent fuel, to separate plutonium.
[Nuclear Control Institute, “China's
Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation
Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm
(accessed 2 June 2008), to Mark Hibbs, "Move to
Block China Certification Doesn't Concern Administration," Nucleonics Week, August 7, 1997, p. 11.]
b. Pakistan
US intel says PRC supplied Pakistan
with nuclear weapon design and likely one or two bombs’-worth of HEU. [Nuclear
Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear
Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm
(accessed 2 June 2008), to Leslie Gelb, "Pakistan Link Perils U.S.-China
Nuclear Pact," New York Times, June 22, 1984, p. Al; Leonard Spector et al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995, p. 49.]
Mid-‘80s: PRC sells tritium to Pak. Tritium is used in
hydrogen-bomb triggers and to increase fission-bomb yields. [Nuclear Control Institute, “China's
Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation
Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm
(accessed 2 June 2008), to Milhollin and White,
"A New China Syndrome," op cit., p. C4.]
(Per David Martin at ccnr:) In 1991 China Nuclear
Energy Industry Corp (CNEIC, a subsidiary of CNNC) sold a 300 MW PWR based on
Qinshan-1 to Pakistan.
1993: US sanctions PRC for selling M-11 nuclear
capable ballistic missiles to Pak.
1995: Pak. receives 5,000 PRC ring magnets of a type
used in Pak’s high-speed uranium-enriching gas centrifuges. [Nuclear
Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation
Words vs. China's Nuclear
Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm
(accessed 2 June 2008), to Tim Weiner, "Atom Arms Parts Sold to Pakistan by China, U.S. Says," New York
Times, February 8, 1996, p. Al.]
CIA’s 1997 report declares that, "China was the
single most important supplier of equipment and technology for weapons of mass
destruction" internationally in the last half of 1996. [U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Nonproliferation
Center, "The
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions," 1997, p. 5.] “The report also states
that, for the period July to December 1996---i.e. after China's May 11, 1996
pledge to the United States not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities---China was Pakistan's "primary source of
nuclear-related equipment and technology..."” [NCI, U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, Nonproliferation Center,
"The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions," 1997, p. 5.] There is also
the problem of China’s
helping Pakistan’s
uranium-enrichment facility at Kahuta. In the ‘90s,
CIA information indicated trouble:
The Kahuta complex was originally
built using technology stolen from the Urenco corporation in the mid-1970s. This illicit trade was clearly
a violation by China
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty , which allows
trade of such technology only to states which have full-scope safeguards under
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). China
acceded to the NPT in 1992, but Pakistan
is not a signatory. {David Martin, Exporting Disaster, ch. 2, “China,
Indonesia, Romania, Korea,
Turkey,”
ccnr.org, November 1996, http://www.ccnr.org/exports_2.html
(accessed 9 June 2008).}
c. Iran
Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassified Report
to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions [1 January – 30 June 2003],” cia.gov, 30 April
2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/jan_jun2003.htm
(accessed 6 June 2008):
Nuclear. In October 1997, China
agreed to end cooperation with Iran
on supplying a uranium conversion facility (UCF), not to enter into any new
nuclear cooperation with Iran,
and to bring to conclusion within a reasonable period of time the two existing
projects. We remained concerned that some interactions of concern
between Chinese and Iranian entities were continuing. China also made bilateral pledges to the United States
that go beyond its 1992 NPT commitment not to assist any country in the
acquisition or development of nuclear weapons. For example, in May 1996, Beijing pledged that it
would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities. We cannot rule out, however, some continued contacts
subsequent to the pledge between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program.
Although Beijing has taken some steps to
educate firms and individuals on the new missile-related export
regulations—offering its first national training course on Chinese export
controls in February 2003—Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related
projects during the first half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance has
helped Pakistan move toward
domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs
and supported Pakistan's
development of solid-propellant MRBMs.
Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move
toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic
missiles. In addition, firms in China
provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to
several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, Libya,
and North Korea.
Thanks
to IAEA statements, there is little doubt that Iran has been engaged in
clandestine nuclear weapons’ programs. It is generally agreed that Iran has a
nuclear weapons’ crash-program underway, some theorizing that it could have a
bomb next year. The Armageddon-oriented nature of Iranian leadership,
combined with Iran’s
fanatic Hezbollah terrorist arm, makes this a genuinely frightening
international threat.
(6) Supplying of certain non-nuclear
weapons can be considered a material contribution to proliferation.
Example: PRC “defensive” missiles have been transferred to Iran, enabling
it to ignore, with impunity, the international community’s warnings of military
sanctions or action against Iranian nuclear sites that are in sustained breach
of international atomic regulations.
(7) China “will be
building reactors elsewhere in the world in 15 or 20 years,” according to the
head of power research at Hong Kong’s CLSA.
[Words of Delaney in Rob Delaney, NP 08-04-09.]
(8) Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited (AECL)
AECL Qinshan contract signed
with the China National Nuclear Corporation for two 728-megawatt nuclear
reactors southeast of Shanghai,
26 November 1996. The Export Development Corporation lent CNNC $1.94 bil. in federal funds. [Asian Pacific Post, Editorial, “How you were kept in the dark to
give Shanghai
lights,” asianpacificpost.com, 24 July 2003, http://www.asianpacificpost.com/portal2/402881910674ebab010674f4b00212f3.do.html
(accessed 7 June 2008).]
China, AECL, and Argentina
signed in Beijing in 2007, a “Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) to conduct a joint study of the potential for cooperation
in design, manufacture, construction and operation of CANDU nuclear power
plants on future projects in Argentina,
Canada and China.” [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, “AECL Signs Memorandum of
Understanding with China and
Argentina
for Future Cooperation on CANDU® Projects,” aecl.ca, 4 September
2007, http://www.aecl.ca/NewsRoom/News/Press-2007/070904.htm
(accessed 7 June 2008).]
2.4.1.3. Advanced Fuel Cycles (Plutonium et al.)
As part of its sales pitch for the CANDU, AECL is
advertising the fact that CANDU has "fuel cycle flexibility". AECL
has determined that CANDU can be used with a variety of low fissile fuels that
would create an advanced fuel cycle that could function in tandem with PWRs. The advanced fuel cycle proposals are designed to
increase uranium utilization and to appeal to countries without significant
uranium reserves. Unfortunately, as with the most common
advanced fuel cycle (reprocessing to separate plutonium) there are increased
proliferation, safety and environmental risks.
For example, the Recovered Uranium (RU) advanced fuel
cycle for the CANDU uses the waste product from LWR spent fuel reprocessing
after the plutonium has been removed. It could also be mixed with plutonium to
form a mixed oxide fuel. These technologies have significant proliferation
risks.
Also promoted is the "DUPIC" cycle, which
stands for "Direct Use of Spent Fuel in CANDU". This technology would
at its simplest introduce LWR spent fuel elements into CANDU fuel channels, or
the spent fuel could be re- fabricated into CANDU fuel. While the DUPIC cycle
would not involve 'wet' chemical reprocessing, the refabrication
(involving as it does highly radioactive spent fuel) would require much of the
remote robotics and other technology necessary in reprocessing, and would thus
carry some proliferation risk. Clearly the reprocessing of spent fuel will also
involve safety and environmental risks.
In early 1991, AECL and the Korea Atomic Energy
Research Institute (KAERI) signed an agreement to jointly develop the
"CANFLEX" CANDU fuel bundle. [202] A
modified version of the standard CANDU fuel bundle, the CANFLEX has outer
elements that are smaller in diameter, necessary for the more extended burn-up
time for the use of Slightly Enriched Uranium (SEU), as opposed to the Natural
Uranium (NU) that is typically used in CANDUs. In
November 1991 AECL and KAERI signed another agreement to jointly explore the
DUPIC fuel cycle. {David Martin,
Exporting Disaster, ch. 2, “China, Indonesia,
Romania, Korea, Turkey,” ccnr.org, November 1996, http://www.ccnr.org/exports_2.html
(accessed 9 June 2008).}
(9) In light of the history
and reality of PRC proliferation, Canadians must ask whether AECL or other
Canadian nuclear cooperation with China is warranted – indeed, is
consistent with Canadians’ health-and-safety interest and obligations under
international law. The PRC’s record of
competitive espionage against Canada
also raises questions about the extent to which technology transfers to the PRC
can be meaningfully managed and controlled. (See issues relating to the
alleged unauthorized copying by China of Canada’s Slowpoke Reactor
system.) Against such a background, even the most modest of liaison
relationships between Canadian and Chinese nuclear authorities, agencies and
businesses, raise further issues about the Chinese Communist Party regime’s
access to, or influence over, Canadian officials, personnel, materiel,
technology and related trade secrets.
(10)
Bearing all of the foregoing in mind, Canada must investigate
the extent to which our industry might inadvertently have contributed to
international nuclear proliferation. Moreover, today, as Canada’s nuclear dealings deepen with the PRC,
and even with Jordan and
possibly other unreliable or unstable regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere,
it is vital that Canada
review and rethink its current nuclear relationships with foreign interests.
Select Bibliography (With Excerpts)
Asian Pacific Post, “A.Q. Khan,” asianpacificpost.com,
5 February 2004, http://www.asianpacificpost.com/portal2/402881910674ebab010674f49cd411e5.do.html
(accessed 7 June 2008).
Asian Pacific Post, “Canada-trained Pakistani nuclear
scientists 'defecting',” asianpacificpost.com, 16
January 2003, http://www.asianpacificpost.com/portal2/402881910674ebab010674f4a1e6122d.do.html
(accessed 7 June 2008).
Asian Pacific Post, Editorial, “How
you were kept in the dark to give Shanghai
lights,” asianpacificpost.com, 24 July 2003, http://www.asianpacificpost.com/portal2/402881910674ebab010674f4b00212f3.do.html
(accessed 7 June 2008).
06-10-10, Asian Pacific Post, “North Korea’s
bomb,” asianpacificpost.com, 10 October 2006, http://www.asianpacificpost.com/portal2/ff8080810e1ecbaf010e33ff39ff0065.do.html
(accessed 7 June 2008).
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, “AECL Awarded
Preventative Maintenance Contract For Qinshan
Power Plant In China,” aecl.ca, 10 August 2007, http://www.aecl.ca/NewsRoom/News/Press-2007/070810.htm
(accessed 8 June 2008).
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited,
“AECL Signs Memorandum of Understanding with China
and Argentina
for Future Cooperation on CANDU® Projects,” aecl.ca, 4 September
2007, http://www.aecl.ca/NewsRoom/News/Press-2007/070904.htm
(accessed 7 June 2008).
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, “Candu
6,” aecl.ca, n.d., http://www.aecl.ca/Reactors/CANDU6.htm
(accessed 9 June 2008).
CANDU
6 is AECL's 700 MWe class
nuclear power reactor. The first CANDU 6 plants went into service in the early
1980s as leading-edge technology, and the design has continuously evolved since
to maintain superior technology and performance.
It was licensed in
the early 1980s in Canada, Argentina and the Republic of Korea.
In 1996, Cernavoda Unit 1 was licensed in Romania, and Wolsong
Unit 2 was licensed in Korea.
Wolsong Units 3 and 4 were licensed in Korea in 1997
and 1999 respectively. Qinshan Units 1 and 2 were
licensed in China
in 2002 and 2003 respectively. In 2007, Cernavoda
Unit 2 was licensed in Romania.
These units came into service ahead of schedule and on budget. There are 11
CANDU 6 units in operation.
· CANDU 6 Units
in Operation
· CANDU 6
Control Centre
· Enhanced CANDU 6
· Safety Systems
· Technical Summary
- [4920KB]
CANDU Reactors Around the World
|
Québec, Canada
|
Gentilly 2
|
1 unit
|
|
Ontario, Canada
|
Darlington
|
4 units
|
|
Ontario, Canada
|
Pickering
|
8 units
|
|
Ontario, Canada
|
Bruce
|
8 units
|
|
New Brunswick, Canada
|
Point Lepreau
|
1 unit
|
|
Argentina
|
Embalse
|
1 unit
|
|
Romania
|
Cernavoda
|
2 units
|
|
Republic of Korea
|
Wolsong
|
4 units
|
|
People’s Republic of China
|
Qinshan
|
2 units
|
|
India
|
RAPS
|
2 units
|
|
Pakistan
|
KANUPP
|
1 unit
|
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, “Partners,” aecl.ca, http://www.aecl.ca/About/Partners.htm
(accessed 9 June 2008).
United States House of Representatives, Committee on
National Security, Military Research and Development Subcommittee, “Threat
Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil
Infrastructure,” commdocs.house.gov, 16 July 1997, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has197010.000/has197010_1.HTM
(accessed 17 April 2008). Dr. Lowell Wood of the Lawrence
Livermore
Laboratory:
Electromagnetic pulses, EMP, generated by high-altitude nuclear
explosions have riveted the attention of the military nuclear tactical
community for three-and-a-half decades since the first comparatively modest one
very unexpectedly turned off the lights over a few million square miles in the
mid-Pacific. This EMP also shut down radio stations, turned off cars, burned
out telephone systems, and wreaked other mischief throughout the Hawaiian Islands nearly 1,000 miles distant from ground
zero.
The potential for even a single high-altitude explosion
of a more deliberate character to impose continental-scale devastation of much
of the equipment of modern civilization and of modern warfare soon became clear.
EMP became a technological substrate for the black humor:
Suppose they gave a war and nobody came.
It was EMP-imposed wreckage, at least as much as that
due to blast, fire, and fallout, which sobered detail studies of the
post-nuclear-attack recovery process. When essentially nothing electrical or
electronic could be relied upon to work, even in rural areas far from the
blast, it appeared surpassingly difficult to bootstrap American national
recovery, and post-attack America
in these studies remained stuck in the very early 20th century until electrical
equipment and electronic components begin to trickle into a Jeffersonian
America from abroad.
For obvious reasons, the entire topic of EMP was highly
classified and associated congressional oversight was generally circumspect and
conducted entirely in closed session. Indeed, this is the first even partly
open session of congressional oversight devoted to the EMP topic which I recall, ...]
Dr. George W. Ullrich, Deputy Director, US Defense
Special Weapons Agency:
EMP
is highly dependent on the gamma ray output of the weapon, as we have seen. The
downward-streaming gamma rays collide with the air molecules, producing high
energy electrons in a process called Compton
scattering. The Compton
electrons, in turn, interact with the Earth's magnetic field, producing an
intense, coherent electromagnetic pulse that propagates downward to the surface
of the Earth. The EMP effect encompasses an area whose perimeter is defined by
the line of sight from the detonation point to the Earth's horizon. Any system
within view of the detonation will experience some level of EMP.
For example, if a megaton class weapon were to be
detonated 400 kilometers above Omaha,
nearly the entire contiguous 48 States would be affected with potentially
damaging EMP experience from Boston to Los Angeles, from Chicago
to New Orleans.
The frequency range of the pulse is enormously wide,
from below 1 hertz to 1 gigahertz, enabling the energy to simultaneously couple
to individual electronic components, small components, larger system
components, as well as distributed long-line conductors.
Page 22 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
One of our earliest experiences with high-altitude EMP
dates back to the resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing in 1962 following a
3-year testing moratorium.
During that brief return to atmospheric testing,
Starfish Prime, a 1.4 megaton detonation conducted over Johnston Island
at an altitude of about 400 kilometers, proved that
these effects could have wide-ranging impact on systems. The effects of EMP
from the Starfish event were observed in Hawaii,
1,300 kilometers east of the detonation. Street
lights and fuses failed on Oahu and telephone service was disrupted on the Island of Kauai.
We have recently learned that Soviet scientists
observed similar disruptions following their high-altitude tests. In one test,
all protective devices and overhead communication lines were damaged at
distances out to 500 kilometers. The same event saw a
1,000 kilometer segment of power line essentially
shut down by these effects.
Over the years, we have come to understand how to
provide effective protection against the effects of EMP. The basic approach is
to envelop the entire system with a integral metallic
shield to exclude externally generated electromagnetic fields from the
interior. Additionally, all mechanical and electrical penetrations through the
shield must be protected.
For example, electrical penetration such as antennas
and power connections must be equipped with filters and surge arresters.
Windows must be coated with wire mesh or conductive coatings. Doors and utility
ports must be sealed with conductive gaskets.
EMP hardening protocols are described in numerous
military standards and handbooks. There are user friendly computer codes
available to facilitate system hardness design. EMP is well understood.
Page 23 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
A particularly good news story is that EMP protection
can be quite affordable. If EMP hardening is built in from the start, the cost
of EMP hardening is a relatively small fraction of the overall system's cost,
approximately 1 to 5 percent. Done after the fact, when the unprotected system
has been already fielded, it can be significantly more expensive.
To further explore cost reduction opportunities, my
agency has an effort under way to develop integrated hardening techniques that
provide protection against multiple hazards. Our initial work focuses on
integrated protection against both high-altitude EMP and high-power microwaves.
For EMP testing purposes, the DOD currently operates a
suite of simulators capable of large area, threat level field illumination.
Also employed are direct current injection techniques and continuous-wave
low-level illumination to evaluate shield integrity and energy coupling
efficiency. While some EMP simulator facilities have been mothballed over the
years, those that remain meet both present and projected customer needs.
To summarize, high-altitude EMP is real and well
understood. We know how to harden to it—we know how to test it. High-altitude
EMP hardening can be achieved at an affordable cost; I mentioned numbers of 1
to 5 percent.
On a final note, high-altitude EMP does not distinguish
between military and civilian systems. Unhardened infrastructure systems, such
as commercial power grids, telecommunication networks, as we have discussed
before, remain vulnerable to widespread outages and upsets due to high-altitude
EMP. While DOD hardens their assets it deems vital, no comparable civilian
programs exist. Thus the detonation of one or a few high-altitude nuclear
weapons could result in serious problems for the entire U.S. civil and
commercial infrastructure.
Nuclear Control Institute, “China's
Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation
Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm
(accessed 2 June 2008).
Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions [1 January – 30 June 2003],” cia.gov, 30 April
2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/jan_jun2003.htm
(accessed 6 June 2008):
China
Over the past several years, Beijing
improved its nonproliferation posture through
commitments to multilateral arms control regimes, promulgation of export controls,
and strengthened oversight mechanisms, but the proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remains of great concern.
Nuclear. In October 1997, China
agreed to end cooperation with Iran
on supplying a uranium conversion facility (UCF), not to enter into any new
nuclear cooperation with Iran,
and to bring to conclusion within a reasonable period of time the two existing
projects. We remained concerned that some interactions of concern
between Chinese and Iranian entities were continuing. China also made bilateral pledges to the United States
that go beyond its 1992 NPT commitment not to assist any country in the
acquisition or development of nuclear weapons. For example, in May 1996, Beijing pledged that it
would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities. We cannot rule out, however, some continued contacts
subsequent to the pledge between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program.
Ballistic Missile. In November 2000, China
committed not to assist, in any way, any country in the development of
ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons, and in August
2002, as part of its commitment, promulgated a comprehensive missile-related
export control system, similar in scope to the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Annex. China
is not a member of the MTCR, but on several occasions has pledged not to sell
MTCR Category I systems.
Although Beijing has taken some steps to
educate firms and individuals on the new missile-related export
regulations—offering its first national training course on Chinese export
controls in February 2003—Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related
projects during the first half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance has
helped Pakistan move toward
domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs
and supported Pakistan's
development of solid-propellant MRBMs.
Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move
toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic
missiles. In addition, firms in China
provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to
several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, Libya,
and North Korea.
Chemical. Since 1997, the US
imposed numerous sanctions against Chinese entities for providing material
support to the Iranian CW program. Evidence during the current reporting
period showed that Chinese firms still provided dual-use CW-related production equipment
and technology to Iran.
In October 2002, China
promulgated new controls on biological items and updated chemical-related
regulations, and now claims to control all major items on the Australia Group
lists.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. During the first half of
2003, China remained a
primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan
and Iran.
Islamabad also continued to negotiate with Beijing for China
to build up to four frigates for Pakistan's navy and to develop the
FC-1 fighter aircraft.
Paul McKay, Ottawa Citizen, “Canada sells
"seeds" for future nuclear weapons programs,” ccnr.org, 7 June 1998, http://www.ccnr.org/news/news_briefs_24.html
(accessed 9 June 2008).
Peter W. Rodman, “Military Dimensions of China’s
Future,” Remarks at the Conference on “China
and the Future of the World,” the University
of Chicago,
defenselink.mil, 28-29 April 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/public_statements/speeches/asd/isa/rodman/apr_28_06.html
(accessed 26 May 2008).
{P}In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping enunciated what is often called the
“24 Character Strategy,” a set of maxims that have often been quoted by Chinese
strategists since then: “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs
calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low
profile; and never claim leadership.” This suggests a desire to downplay
ambition in the near term and a patient long-term strategy to build up China’s
power to maximize options for the future.{endP}
George Tenet, “DCI Before the Senate
Select Committee on
Intelligence,” cia.gov, 28 January
1998, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1998/dci_speech_012898.html
(accessed 6 June 2008).
08-05-20, United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
“China’s Proliferation Practices,” Hearings, Statement of Henry Sokolski, uscc.gov, 20 May 2008, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/written_testimonies/08_05_20_wrts/08_05_20_sokolski_statement.php
(accessed 25 May 2008).
Wikipedia, “Canada
and weapons of mass destruction,” en.wikipedia.org, 4 June 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction
(accessed 9 June 2008).
Canada continues to
promote peaceful nuclear technology exemplified by the CANDU reactor. Unlike
most designs, the CANDU does not require enriched fuel, and in theory is
therefore much less likely to lead to the development of weaponized
fissile fuel. However, like all power reactor designs, CANDU reactors produce
and use plutonium
in their fuel rods during normal operation (roughly 50% of the energy generated
in a CANDU reactor comes from the in situ fission of plutonium created
in the uranium