Chinese Nuclear Proliferation

Including Canadian Dimensions

 

Notes for Remarks by David B. Harris,

President and CEO, Democracy House

to the

 Canadian Coalition for Democracies’ China Symposium

10 June 2008, Room 200, West Block, House of Commons, Ottawa, Canada

 

-         DRAFT NOTES ONLY; CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY -

 

(1) Nuclear weapons, related material, and their proliferation, constitute a grave and growing danger.

 

Many consequences of nuclear detonations are well known: blast effect, searing heat, ionizing radiation.  Hiroshima and Nagasaki’s suffering continue to this day.

 

We’re warned of nuclear winter.

 

 

(2) ElectroMagnetic Pulse

 

The implications of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effect, an especially devastating consequence of high-altitude nuclear explosions of over one megaton yield, were largely secret before 1997.  That year, and in some legislative forums, thereafter, increasing heed was paid to the threat to society and entire nation-states, represented by EMP.  Dr. Lowell Wood of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory was among a number of experts to warn of this in testimony before US congressional bodies. Expert predictions indicate that EMP would return the US to a state technologically, economically and perhaps even socially, reminiscent of very early Twentieth Century life.  One specialist spoke of a return to Jeffersonian America – the early part of the 1800s. No electricity, cars, modern medicine. Survival of the fittest. Social, political and economic colonization by those with military and economic might.  So, perhaps, China and Saudi Arabia?  All of this could be achieved by a single high-altitude atomic explosion that would not necessarily, in and of itself, kill a single individual on the ground.

 

 

Electromagnetic pulses, EMP, generated by high-altitude nuclear explosions have riveted the attention of the military nuclear tactical community for three-and-a-half decades since the first comparatively modest one very unexpectedly turned off the lights over a few million square miles in the mid-Pacific. This EMP also shut down radio stations, turned off cars, burned out telephone systems, and wreaked other mischief throughout the Hawaiian Islands nearly 1,000 miles distant from ground zero.

    The potential for even a single high-altitude explosion of a more deliberate character to impose continental-scale devastation of much of the equipment of modern civilization and of modern warfare soon became clear. EMP became a technological substrate for the black humor: Suppose they gave a war and nobody came.

    It was EMP-imposed wreckage, at least as much as that due to blast, fire, and fallout, which sobered detail studies of the post-nuclear-attack recovery process. When essentially nothing electrical or electronic could be relied upon to work, even in rural areas far from the blast, it appeared surpassingly difficult to bootstrap American national recovery, and post-attack America in these studies remained stuck in the very early 20th century until electrical equipment and electronic components begin to trickle into a Jeffersonian America from abroad.{United States House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Research and Development Subcommittee, “Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure,” commdocs.house.gov, 16 July 1997, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has197010.000/has197010_1.HTM (accessed 17 April 2008). [Remarks by Dr. Lowell Wood of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, in which he describes the serious and widespread consequences of the electromagnetic pulse that might result from a high-altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon.}

(3) In light of this, civilization must put an end to nuclear proliferation, before nuclear proliferation puts an end to civilization.

 

(4) The People’s Republic of China (hereinafter “PRC” or “China”) has been a serious problem.  The country is driven by a demonstrably-aggressive regime whose history of human-rights’ abuses – from gulag and slave-labour colonies to organ-harvesting – points to the governing Communist Party dictatorship’s gross failure to accept norms of civilized international conduct.  The Party is a nuclear military power, and, in the absence of any noticeable increase in threats faced by the country, has presided over a monumental 18% per annum growth in its military budget. Menace.

 

 

(5) China Proliferates to:

a.     General

 

David Martin (at ccnr) says that China’s nuclear tests of the 1990s were in the teeth of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.  Indeed, they were “a significant stumbling block to progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”  China joined the IAEA in ’84, and NPT in 1992. 

 

George Tenet, “DCI Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” cia.gov, 28 January 1998, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1998/dci_speech_012898.html (accessed 6 June 2008):

 

Chinese and Russian assistance to proliferant countries requires particular attention, despite signs of progress. My statement for the record provides the details but some key points should be made here.

 

With regard to China, its defense industries are under increasing pressure to become profit making organizations--an imperative that can put them at odds with US interests. Conventional arm sales have lagged in recent years, encouraging Chinese defense industries to look to WMD technology- related sales, primarily to Pakistan and Iran, in order to recoup. There is no question that China has contributed to WMD advances in these countries.

 

On the positive side, there have recently been some signs of improvement in China's proliferation posture. China recently enacted its first comprehensive laws governing nuclear technology exports. It also appears to have tightened down on its most worrisome nuclear transfers, and it recently renewed its pledge to halt sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.

 

But China's relations with some proliferant countries are long-standing and deep, Mr. Chairman. The jury is still out on whether the recent changes are broad enough in scope and whether they will hold over the longer term. As such, Chinese activities in this area will require continued close watching.

 

 

Apartheid South Africa: China sent 60 tons of unsafeguarded enriched uranium in 1981 to then-non-NPT apartheid South Africa, which may have allowed one S. African facility to triple weapons-grade production at at least one nuclear facility. [Footnoted in Nuclear Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm (accessed 2 June 2008), to Leonard Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, 1990, p. 274; Michael Brenner, "People's Republic of China," in International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation, Ed. William Potter, 1990, p. 253.] Also in 1981, PRC shipped highly enriched uranium, uranium hexafluoride and heavy water to non-NPT Argentina, a country with a nuclear weapons program. [Footnoted in Nuclear Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm (accessed 2 June 2008), to Judith Miller, "U.S. is Holding Up Peking Atom Talks," New York Times, September 19, 1982; Brenner, ibid.; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar," Washington Post, May 12, 1991, p. C4.]

 

Algeria: From about November 1984, China was building a significant unsafeguarded plutonium-production reactor, only months after saying all PRC exports would go through IAEA clearance. [Nuclear Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm (accessed 2 June 2008), to Vipin Gupta, "Algeria's Nuclear Ambitions," International Defense Review, #4, 1992, pp. 329-330.]   Also provided equipment usable for handling radioactive spent fuel, to separate plutonium. [Nuclear Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm (accessed 2 June 2008), to Mark Hibbs, "Move to Block China Certification Doesn't Concern Administration," Nucleonics Week, August 7, 1997, p. 11.]

 

 

b.     Pakistan

 

US intel says PRC supplied Pakistan with nuclear weapon design and likely one or two bombs’-worth of HEU. [Nuclear Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm (accessed 2 June 2008), to Leslie Gelb, "Pakistan Link Perils U.S.-China Nuclear Pact," New York Times, June 22, 1984, p. Al; Leonard Spector et al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995, p. 49.]

 

Mid-‘80s: PRC sells tritium to Pak. Tritium is used in hydrogen-bomb triggers and to increase fission-bomb yields.  [Nuclear Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm (accessed 2 June 2008), to Milhollin and White, "A New China Syndrome," op cit., p. C4.]

 

(Per David Martin at ccnr:) In 1991 China Nuclear Energy Industry Corp (CNEIC, a subsidiary of CNNC) sold a 300 MW PWR based on Qinshan-1 to Pakistan.

 

1993: US sanctions PRC for selling M-11 nuclear capable ballistic missiles to Pak.

 

1995: Pak. receives 5,000 PRC ring magnets of a type used in Pak’s high-speed uranium-enriching gas centrifuges. [Nuclear Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm (accessed 2 June 2008), to Tim Weiner, "Atom Arms Parts Sold to Pakistan by China, U.S. Says," New York Times, February 8, 1996, p. Al.]

 

CIA’s 1997 report declares that, "China was the single most important supplier of equipment and technology for weapons of mass destruction" internationally in the last half of 1996. [U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Nonproliferation Center, "The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," 1997, p. 5.]  “The report also states that, for the period July to December 1996---i.e. after China's May 11, 1996 pledge to the United States not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities---China was Pakistan's "primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology..."” [NCI, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Nonproliferation Center, "The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," 1997, p. 5.]  There is also the problem of China’s helping Pakistan’s uranium-enrichment facility at Kahuta. In the ‘90s, CIA information indicated trouble:

 

The Kahuta complex was originally built using technology stolen from the Urenco corporation in the mid-1970s. This illicit trade was clearly a violation by China of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty , which allows trade of such technology only to states which have full-scope safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). China acceded to the NPT in 1992, but Pakistan is not a signatory. {David Martin, Exporting Disaster, ch. 2, “China, Indonesia, Romania, Korea, Turkey,” ccnr.org, November 1996, http://www.ccnr.org/exports_2.html (accessed 9 June 2008).}

 

 

c.      Iran

 

Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions [1 January – 30 June 2003],” cia.gov, 30 April 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/jan_jun2003.htm (accessed 6 June 2008):

 

 

Nuclear.  In October 1997, China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on supplying a uranium conversion facility (UCF), not to enter into any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, and to bring to conclusion within a reasonable period of time the two existing projects.  We remained concerned that some interactions of concern between Chinese and Iranian entities were continuing.  China also made bilateral pledges to the United States that go beyond its 1992 NPT commitment not to assist any country in the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons.  For example, in May 1996, Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.  We cannot rule out, however, some continued contacts subsequent to the pledge between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

 

 

Although Beijing has taken some steps to educate firms and individuals on the new missile-related export regulations—offering its first national training course on Chinese export controls in February 2003—Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the first half of 2003.  Chinese entity assistance has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs and supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant MRBMs.  Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles.  In addition, firms in China provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

 

Thanks to IAEA statements, there is little doubt that Iran has been engaged in clandestine nuclear weapons’ programs.  It is generally agreed that Iran has a nuclear weapons’ crash-program underway, some theorizing that it could have a bomb next year.  The Armageddon-oriented nature of Iranian leadership, combined with Iran’s fanatic Hezbollah terrorist arm, makes this a genuinely frightening international threat.

 

 

(6) Supplying of certain non-nuclear weapons can be considered a material contribution to proliferation.  Example: PRC “defensive” missiles have been transferred to Iran, enabling it to ignore, with impunity, the international community’s warnings of military sanctions or action against Iranian nuclear sites that are in sustained breach of international atomic regulations.

 

 

(7) China “will be building reactors elsewhere in the world in 15 or 20 years,” according to the head of power research at Hong Kong’s CLSA. [Words of Delaney in Rob Delaney, NP 08-04-09.]

 

(8) Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL)

 

AECL Qinshan contract signed with the China National Nuclear Corporation for two 728-megawatt nuclear reactors southeast of Shanghai, 26 November 1996.  The Export Development Corporation lent CNNC $1.94 bil. in federal funds. [Asian Pacific Post, Editorial, “How you were kept in the dark to give Shanghai lights,” asianpacificpost.com, 24 July 2003, http://www.asianpacificpost.com/portal2/402881910674ebab010674f4b00212f3.do.html (accessed 7 June 2008).]

 

China, AECL, and Argentina signed in Beijing in 2007, a “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to conduct a joint study of the potential for cooperation in design, manufacture, construction and operation of CANDU nuclear power plants on future projects in Argentina, Canada and China.” [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, “AECL Signs Memorandum of Understanding with China and Argentina for Future Cooperation on CANDU® Projects,” aecl.ca, 4 September 2007, http://www.aecl.ca/NewsRoom/News/Press-2007/070904.htm (accessed 7 June 2008).]

 

2.4.1.3. Advanced Fuel Cycles (Plutonium et al.)

As part of its sales pitch for the CANDU, AECL is advertising the fact that CANDU has "fuel cycle flexibility". AECL has determined that CANDU can be used with a variety of low fissile fuels that would create an advanced fuel cycle that could function in tandem with PWRs. The advanced fuel cycle proposals are designed to increase uranium utilization and to appeal to countries without significant uranium reserves. Unfortunately, as with the most common advanced fuel cycle (reprocessing to separate plutonium) there are increased proliferation, safety and environmental risks.

 

For example, the Recovered Uranium (RU) advanced fuel cycle for the CANDU uses the waste product from LWR spent fuel reprocessing after the plutonium has been removed. It could also be mixed with plutonium to form a mixed oxide fuel. These technologies have significant proliferation risks.

 

Also promoted is the "DUPIC" cycle, which stands for "Direct Use of Spent Fuel in CANDU". This technology would at its simplest introduce LWR spent fuel elements into CANDU fuel channels, or the spent fuel could be re- fabricated into CANDU fuel. While the DUPIC cycle would not involve 'wet' chemical reprocessing, the refabrication (involving as it does highly radioactive spent fuel) would require much of the remote robotics and other technology necessary in reprocessing, and would thus carry some proliferation risk. Clearly the reprocessing of spent fuel will also involve safety and environmental risks.

 

In early 1991, AECL and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) signed an agreement to jointly develop the "CANFLEX" CANDU fuel bundle. [202] A modified version of the standard CANDU fuel bundle, the CANFLEX has outer elements that are smaller in diameter, necessary for the more extended burn-up time for the use of Slightly Enriched Uranium (SEU), as opposed to the Natural Uranium (NU) that is typically used in CANDUs. In November 1991 AECL and KAERI signed another agreement to jointly explore the DUPIC fuel cycle. {David Martin, Exporting Disaster, ch. 2, “China, Indonesia, Romania, Korea, Turkey,” ccnr.org, November 1996, http://www.ccnr.org/exports_2.html (accessed 9 June 2008).}

 

(9) In light of the history and reality of PRC proliferation, Canadians must ask whether AECL or other Canadian nuclear cooperation with China is warranted – indeed, is consistent with Canadians’ health-and-safety interest and obligations under international law.  The PRC’s record of competitive espionage against Canada also raises questions about the extent to which technology transfers to the PRC can be meaningfully managed and controlled.  (See issues relating to the alleged unauthorized copying by China of Canada’s Slowpoke Reactor system.)  Against such a background, even the most modest of liaison relationships between Canadian and Chinese nuclear authorities, agencies and businesses, raise further issues about the Chinese Communist Party regime’s access to, or influence over, Canadian officials, personnel, materiel, technology and related trade secrets.

 

(10)                    Bearing all of the foregoing in mind, Canada must investigate the extent to which our industry might inadvertently have contributed to international nuclear proliferation.  Moreover, today, as Canada’s nuclear dealings deepen with the PRC, and even with Jordan and possibly other unreliable or unstable regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere, it is vital that Canada review and rethink its current nuclear relationships with foreign interests.

 

 


Select Bibliography (With Excerpts)

 

Asian Pacific Post, “A.Q. Khan,” asianpacificpost.com, 5 February 2004, http://www.asianpacificpost.com/portal2/402881910674ebab010674f49cd411e5.do.html (accessed 7 June 2008).

 

Asian Pacific Post, “Canada-trained Pakistani nuclear scientists 'defecting',” asianpacificpost.com, 16 January 2003, http://www.asianpacificpost.com/portal2/402881910674ebab010674f4a1e6122d.do.html (accessed 7 June 2008).

 

Asian Pacific Post, Editorial, “How you were kept in the dark to give Shanghai lights,” asianpacificpost.com, 24 July 2003, http://www.asianpacificpost.com/portal2/402881910674ebab010674f4b00212f3.do.html (accessed 7 June 2008).

 

06-10-10, Asian Pacific Post, “North Korea’s bomb,” asianpacificpost.com, 10 October 2006, http://www.asianpacificpost.com/portal2/ff8080810e1ecbaf010e33ff39ff0065.do.html (accessed 7 June 2008).

 

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, “AECL Awarded Preventative Maintenance Contract For Qinshan Power Plant In China,” aecl.ca, 10 August 2007, http://www.aecl.ca/NewsRoom/News/Press-2007/070810.htm (accessed 8 June 2008).

 

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, “AECL Signs Memorandum of Understanding with China and Argentina for Future Cooperation on CANDU® Projects,” aecl.ca, 4 September 2007, http://www.aecl.ca/NewsRoom/News/Press-2007/070904.htm (accessed 7 June 2008).

 

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, “Candu 6,” aecl.ca, n.d., http://www.aecl.ca/Reactors/CANDU6.htm (accessed 9 June 2008).

CANDU 6 is AECL's 700 MWe class nuclear power reactor. The first CANDU 6 plants went into service in the early 1980s as leading-edge technology, and the design has continuously evolved since to maintain superior technology and performance.

It was licensed in the early 1980s in Canada, Argentina and the Republic of Korea. In 1996, Cernavoda Unit 1 was licensed in Romania, and Wolsong Unit 2 was licensed in Korea. Wolsong Units 3 and 4 were licensed in Korea in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Qinshan Units 1 and 2 were licensed in China in 2002 and 2003 respectively. In 2007, Cernavoda Unit 2 was licensed in Romania. These units came into service ahead of schedule and on budget. There are 11 CANDU 6 units in operation.

·         CANDU 6 Units in Operation

·         CANDU 6 Control Centre

·         Enhanced CANDU 6

·         Safety Systems

·         Technical Summaryhttp://www.aecl.ca/system/images/assets/pdf_sm.gif - [4920KB]

CANDU Reactors Around the World

Québec, Canada

Gentilly 2

1 unit

Ontario, Canada

Darlington

4 units

Ontario, Canada

Pickering

8 units

Ontario, Canada

Bruce

8 units

New Brunswick, Canada

Point Lepreau

1 unit

Argentina

Embalse

1 unit

Romania

Cernavoda

2 units

Republic of Korea

Wolsong

4 units

People’s Republic of China

Qinshan

2 units

India

RAPS

2 units

Pakistan

KANUPP

1 unit

 

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, “Partners,” aecl.ca, http://www.aecl.ca/About/Partners.htm (accessed 9 June 2008).

 

United States House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Research and Development Subcommittee, “Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure,” commdocs.house.gov, 16 July 1997, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has197010.000/has197010_1.HTM (accessed 17 April 2008). Dr. Lowell Wood of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory:

 

Electromagnetic pulses, EMP, generated by high-altitude nuclear explosions have riveted the attention of the military nuclear tactical community for three-and-a-half decades since the first comparatively modest one very unexpectedly turned off the lights over a few million square miles in the mid-Pacific. This EMP also shut down radio stations, turned off cars, burned out telephone systems, and wreaked other mischief throughout the Hawaiian Islands nearly 1,000 miles distant from ground zero.

    The potential for even a single high-altitude explosion of a more deliberate character to impose continental-scale devastation of much of the equipment of modern civilization and of modern warfare soon became clear. EMP became a technological substrate for the black humor: Suppose they gave a war and nobody came.

    It was EMP-imposed wreckage, at least as much as that due to blast, fire, and fallout, which sobered detail studies of the post-nuclear-attack recovery process. When essentially nothing electrical or electronic could be relied upon to work, even in rural areas far from the blast, it appeared surpassingly difficult to bootstrap American national recovery, and post-attack America in these studies remained stuck in the very early 20th century until electrical equipment and electronic components begin to trickle into a Jeffersonian America from abroad.

    For obvious reasons, the entire topic of EMP was highly classified and associated congressional oversight was generally circumspect and conducted entirely in closed session. Indeed, this is the first even partly open session of congressional oversight devoted to the EMP topic which I recall, ...]

 

 

       Dr. George W. Ullrich, Deputy Director, US Defense Special Weapons Agency:

 

    EMP is highly dependent on the gamma ray output of the weapon, as we have seen. The downward-streaming gamma rays collide with the air molecules, producing high energy electrons in a process called Compton scattering. The Compton electrons, in turn, interact with the Earth's magnetic field, producing an intense, coherent electromagnetic pulse that propagates downward to the surface of the Earth. The EMP effect encompasses an area whose perimeter is defined by the line of sight from the detonation point to the Earth's horizon. Any system within view of the detonation will experience some level of EMP.

    For example, if a megaton class weapon were to be detonated 400 kilometers above Omaha, nearly the entire contiguous 48 States would be affected with potentially damaging EMP experience from Boston to Los Angeles, from Chicago to New Orleans.

    The frequency range of the pulse is enormously wide, from below 1 hertz to 1 gigahertz, enabling the energy to simultaneously couple to individual electronic components, small components, larger system components, as well as distributed long-line conductors.

 Page 22       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC    Segment 2 Of 2  


    One of our earliest experiences with high-altitude EMP dates back to the resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing in 1962 following a 3-year testing moratorium.

    During that brief return to atmospheric testing, Starfish Prime, a 1.4 megaton detonation conducted over Johnston Island at an altitude of about 400 kilometers, proved that these effects could have wide-ranging impact on systems. The effects of EMP from the Starfish event were observed in Hawaii, 1,300 kilometers east of the detonation. Street lights and fuses failed on Oahu and telephone service was disrupted on the Island of Kauai.

    We have recently learned that Soviet scientists observed similar disruptions following their high-altitude tests. In one test, all protective devices and overhead communication lines were damaged at distances out to 500 kilometers. The same event saw a 1,000 kilometer segment of power line essentially shut down by these effects.

    Over the years, we have come to understand how to provide effective protection against the effects of EMP. The basic approach is to envelop the entire system with a integral metallic shield to exclude externally generated electromagnetic fields from the interior. Additionally, all mechanical and electrical penetrations through the shield must be protected.

    For example, electrical penetration such as antennas and power connections must be equipped with filters and surge arresters. Windows must be coated with wire mesh or conductive coatings. Doors and utility ports must be sealed with conductive gaskets.

    EMP hardening protocols are described in numerous military standards and handbooks. There are user friendly computer codes available to facilitate system hardness design. EMP is well understood.

 Page 23       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC    Segment 2 Of 2  


    A particularly good news story is that EMP protection can be quite affordable. If EMP hardening is built in from the start, the cost of EMP hardening is a relatively small fraction of the overall system's cost, approximately 1 to 5 percent. Done after the fact, when the unprotected system has been already fielded, it can be significantly more expensive.

    To further explore cost reduction opportunities, my agency has an effort under way to develop integrated hardening techniques that provide protection against multiple hazards. Our initial work focuses on integrated protection against both high-altitude EMP and high-power microwaves.

    For EMP testing purposes, the DOD currently operates a suite of simulators capable of large area, threat level field illumination. Also employed are direct current injection techniques and continuous-wave low-level illumination to evaluate shield integrity and energy coupling efficiency. While some EMP simulator facilities have been mothballed over the years, those that remain meet both present and projected customer needs.

    To summarize, high-altitude EMP is real and well understood. We know how to harden to it—we know how to test it. High-altitude EMP hardening can be achieved at an affordable cost; I mentioned numbers of 1 to 5 percent.

    On a final note, high-altitude EMP does not distinguish between military and civilian systems. Unhardened infrastructure systems, such as commercial power grids, telecommunication networks, as we have discussed before, remain vulnerable to widespread outages and upsets due to high-altitude EMP. While DOD hardens their assets it deems vital, no comparable civilian programs exist. Thus the detonation of one or a few high-altitude nuclear weapons could result in serious problems for the entire U.S. civil and commercial infrastructure.

 

Nuclear Control Institute, “China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation Deeds,” nci.org, n.d. (1997?), http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm (accessed 2 June 2008).

 

Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions [1 January – 30 June 2003],” cia.gov, 30 April 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/jan_jun2003.htm (accessed 6 June 2008):

 

China

Over the past several years, Beijing improved its nonproliferation posture through commitments to multilateral arms control regimes, promulgation of export controls, and strengthened oversight mechanisms, but the proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remains of great concern.

 

Nuclear.  In October 1997, China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on supplying a uranium conversion facility (UCF), not to enter into any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, and to bring to conclusion within a reasonable period of time the two existing projects.  We remained concerned that some interactions of concern between Chinese and Iranian entities were continuing.  China also made bilateral pledges to the United States that go beyond its 1992 NPT commitment not to assist any country in the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons.  For example, in May 1996, Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.  We cannot rule out, however, some continued contacts subsequent to the pledge between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

 

Ballistic Missile.  In November 2000, China committed not to assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons, and in August 2002, as part of its commitment, promulgated a comprehensive missile-related export control system, similar in scope to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex.  China is not a member of the MTCR, but on several occasions has pledged not to sell MTCR Category I systems.

 

Although Beijing has taken some steps to educate firms and individuals on the new missile-related export regulations—offering its first national training course on Chinese export controls in February 2003—Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the first half of 2003.  Chinese entity assistance has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs and supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant MRBMs.  Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles.  In addition, firms in China provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

 

Chemical.  Since 1997, the US imposed numerous sanctions against Chinese entities for providing material support to the Iranian CW program.  Evidence during the current reporting period showed that Chinese firms still provided dual-use CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran.  In October 2002, China promulgated new controls on biological items and updated chemical-related regulations, and now claims to control all major items on the Australia Group lists.

 

Advanced Conventional Weapons.  During the first half of 2003, China remained a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan and Iran.   Islamabad also continued to negotiate with Beijing for China to build up to four frigates for Pakistan's navy and to develop the FC-1 fighter aircraft.

 

Paul McKay, Ottawa Citizen, “Canada sells "seeds" for future nuclear weapons programs,” ccnr.org, 7 June 1998, http://www.ccnr.org/news/news_briefs_24.html (accessed 9 June 2008).

 

 

Peter W. Rodman, “Military Dimensions of China’s Future,” Remarks at the Conference on “China and the Future of the World,” the University of Chicago, defenselink.mil, 28-29 April 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/public_statements/speeches/asd/isa/rodman/apr_28_06.html (accessed 26 May 2008).

 

{P}In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping enunciated what is often called the “24 Character Strategy,” a set of maxims that have often been quoted by Chinese strategists since then: “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” This suggests a desire to downplay ambition in the near term and a patient long-term strategy to build up China’s power to maximize options for the future.{endP}

 

Elaine Shannon, “Iran's Green-Salt Blues,” time.com, 5 February 2006, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1156595,00.html (accessed 8 June 2008).

 

George Tenet, “DCI Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” cia.gov, 28 January 1998, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1998/dci_speech_012898.html (accessed 6 June 2008).

 

08-05-20, United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “China’s Proliferation Practices,” Hearings, Statement of Henry Sokolski, uscc.gov, 20 May 2008, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/written_testimonies/08_05_20_wrts/08_05_20_sokolski_statement.php (accessed 25 May 2008).

 

 

Wikipedia, “Canada and weapons of mass destruction,” en.wikipedia.org, 4 June 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction  (accessed 9 June 2008).

 

Canada continues to promote peaceful nuclear technology exemplified by the CANDU reactor. Unlike most designs, the CANDU does not require enriched fuel, and in theory is therefore much less likely to lead to the development of weaponized fissile fuel. However, like all power reactor designs, CANDU reactors produce and use plutonium in their fuel rods during normal operation (roughly 50% of the energy generated in a CANDU reactor comes from the in situ fission of plutonium created in the uranium